EXHIBIT B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SPHERE 3D CORP., : Docket #23-cv-02954

Plaintiff, :

-against- :

GRYPHON DIGITAL MINING, INC., : New York, New York

June 27, 2024

Defendant.

-----;

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE HONORABLE VALERIE FIGUEREDO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff: DONTZIN NAGY & FLEISSIG, LLP

BY: GREGORY N. WOLFE, ESQ.

980 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10075

For Defendant: HOGAN LOVELLS US, LLP

BY: ELIZABETH C. CARTER, ESQ.

WILLIAM C. WINTER, ESQ.

390 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10017

Transcription Service: Marissa Lewandowski

Phone: (631) 813-9335

E-mail:marissamignano@gmail.com

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; Transcript produced by transcription service

Case 1:23-cv-02954-PKC-VF	Document 111	2 Filed 11/2	2/24 Page 3	of 70	
	INDEX				
	EXAMINATIONS				
<u>Witness</u> None	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Cross</u>	Re- <u>Direct</u>	Re- <u>Cross</u>	

<u>EXHIBITS</u>

Exhibit Voir Number Description ID In Dire

1 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Sphere 3D Corp. versus 2 Gryphon Digital Mining, Inc, Case Number 23-cv-2954. The Honorable Valerie Figueredo presiding. 3 Counsels, can you please make your 4 5 appearances for the record, starting with plaintiff's counsel. 6 7 MR. WOLFE: Greg Wolfe on behalf of Sphere 8 3D. THE DEPUTY CLERK: Defense? 9 10 MS. CARTER: Elizabeth Carter from Hogan 11 Lovells, representing the defendant and 12 counter-plaintiff Gryphon Digital Mining, Inc. 13 MR. WINTER: William C. Winter on behalf of 14 Gryphon Digital Mining, Inc. 15 THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. This 16 is Judge Figueredo. 17 So we have, I guess, two sets of disputes. 18 I have the letter from Gryphon that came in May 21st. It's at ECF-81. And then there was a 19 20 response by Sphere, May 28th. It was ECF-82. 21 think we can start with that dispute first. 22 But I'll just -- I guess just before we get 23 into the details of the issues raised at ECF-81, I just, by way of background, would just appreciate 24 25 just, you know, a very brief explanation as to --

1 just to get the context of what these two businesses 2 do. And I know there was, like, this spoofing incident where these bitcoins were taken, but I'll 3 just admit I have no idea. I don't really 5 understand how bitcoins work or anything like that. So if there's just some context or background that 6 you think would be helpful to better understand why 7 some of these -- you want some of these documents or 8 9 just to put some of these discovery requests in 10 context, I'd be very appreciative. 11 And either side can go ahead, or if both 12 sides want to give me the background, that's fine, 13 too. 14 MR. WOLFE: I'm happy to do --15 MS. CARTER: Greg, do you mind if I go, 16 just because it sounds like our motion is going to 17 occur first? 18 MR. WOLFE: No problem. And I'm sure you'll give a neutral recitation. And I would just 19 20 ask, Judge, if there's anything I disagree with, I'd 21 be given the opportunity to respond. 22 THE COURT: Yeah, no, and, again, this is 23 just my lack of understanding of, I quess, mining of 24 bitcoins. And I thought maybe before we got into 25 the disputes, it would just make sense for me to get

a better sense of what these businesses do. But I'm happy to have both sides speak, if that's helpful.

MS. CARTER: Yeah. No problem. Elizabeth Carter again for Gryphon.

So Gryphon -- my client, Gryphon Digital Mining, Incorporated, is a digital miner, and what that means is that it operates many, many, many miners, which are very sophisticated computers, that are constantly running and solving complicated algorithms for the purpose of trying to obtain bitcoin. And obviously, there is a market for the value of bitcoin, which, you know, fluctuates up and down quite precipitously one way and the other.

And so its business essentially is to, you know, purchase, you know, thousands of computers, find adequate hosting spaces for these computers to operate. You know, they require a lot of electricity, as you might imagine. They require kind of a very specific environment, like a condition in which they operate. It has to be cool. As you know, computers break down. They need maintenance. So making sure that the computers are kind of constantly operating in order to solve these, essentially, math problems with the hope of getting bitcoin.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And then beyond that, there's also some strategy involved to the extent that there are various mining pools. So, you know, computers that tend to be quite expensive that can essentially join their forces together in order to obtain bitcoin, which, again, has a value that fluctuates up or down based on the market for that particular bitcoin. THE COURT: Okay. So that's super helpful because I think one of the disputes involved information about the miners. And --MS. CARTER: Yeah. THE COURT: -- I guess I'll admit, I thought at one point, I was like, are these actual humans? It sounds like it's not. It's a computer. So this is very helpful, Ms. Carter. Mr. Wolfe, did you want to add anything? MR. WOLFE: Yeah. I think Ms. Carter's description is generally correct. And I'll admit, the first time I heard about bitcoin mining, I, too, thought that they were people in mine shafts. The only additional context I'll provide is some companies do what's called self-hosting, meaning they host the miners themselves. Sphere and, my understanding, Gryphon, too, they don't do

their own hosting. So what they do is they go out

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

into the market and they find third-party hosts, who -- you know, they'll sign a contract with the host. And, basically, that host is then responsible for hosting the miners, doing all the things Ms. Carter described, making sure the miners are running, keeping them cool, et cetera, et cetera. THE COURT: And is Sphere in the same business, then? MR. WOLFE: Exactly right. So Sphere and Gryphon are in the same line of business. And to give a little bit more background, then, I'll try and be as neutral as possible. The parties were, at one point, thinking about merging, and as part of merger negotiations, the parties agreed to enter into a management services agreement in which Gryphon -- and I'll just track the language -- became the exclusive provider of management services, basically, for Sphere's crypto operations. Sphere does have some legacy operations from before it became a crypto company, but generally, its business is just cryptocurrencies. So they're both crypto miners in the same industry. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So then, Ms.

Carter, I guess since we're going to start with the

dispute at ECF-81, did you want to go ahead?

MS. CARTER: I would love to. Thank you for the opportunity to speak, Your Honor.

Fortunately for us, at least the first issue that's been teed up for Your Honor, this so-called spoofing incident, doesn't necessitate a deep understanding of cryptocurrency and miners to kind of grasp what the issue is.

So what we refer to as the, quote/unquote, spoofing attack in shorthand really refers to an incident that happened in January of 2023 between Sphere and Gryphon. And what it included was basically, at that time in January, there was a third-party hostile actor that was basically able to kind of infiltrate Sphere's systems and basically impersonate its CFO, Kurt Kalbfleisch, using a very similar, but slightly different email account in order to kind of induce Gryphon's CEO, Mr. Chang, into sending this third-party actor bitcoin, as opposed to Sphere.

So Mr. Kalbfleisch, you know, sends an email -- you know, the real Mr. Kalbfleisch sends an email to Mr. Chang, says, you know, pursuant to this, you know, agreement that we have, that we're operating under the MSA, please send us, you know,

this number of bitcoin, and then Mr. Chang responds. And then at that point, a third party who was not Mr. Kalbfleisch, although, using an email that is extremely close to his real email, just with an additional S -- so instead of "Sphere," it says "Spheres" -- is able to somehow insert him or herself into the email and basically kind of takes over the conversation from Mr. Kalbfleisch and says, you know, Gryphon, you should, you know, send us the bitcoin, you know, to this wallet. It's the new one, yada, yada, yada.

It's basically total chicanery farce that, unfortunately, resulted in Mr. Chang sending bitcoin to a wallet that was actually unaffiliated with Sphere, so it was fraud.

So in the second amended complaint, which was filed by Plaintiff, and that's at ECF-36, it's riddled with references to this spoofing incident. I actually counted beforehand, and I think of the approximately 100 or so paragraphs in the paragraph, 24 of them actually describe and reference the spoofing incident. And then there are another -- I think there were 36 times that either "spoof" or "spoofing" is used. So suffice it to say, it features largely in the complaint.

So Sphere essentially blames Gryphon for the incident. It says that Mr. Chang, he shouldn't have been fooled so easily by this third party, and that it's -- you know, the fact that he was fooled really evidences a lack of internal controls that Gryphon had. And that really underlies both its breach of contract, the MSA agreement, and also another claim that Sphere has lodged against Gryphon, which is breach of fiduciary duty.

And that's, for example, at paragraph 5 of the second amended complaint where it says: Gryphon and Mr. Chang, however, recently found for multiple spoofing attacks targeting Sphere's digital assets that would -- and this is the key part -- that would have been avoided had Gryphon had internal control systems and policies and procedures in place and adhered to applicable law.

So, not surprisingly, given the number of times that this spoofing incident was referenced in the complaint, Sphere has sought discovery of Gryphon into the incident through its document requests that were exchanged by the parties, more recently, in April of this year. For example, at Request Number 3, Sphere thought all documents and communications relating to Gryphon's internal

policies. Again, that's at Request Number 3.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

We objected, but agreed to produce documents pursuant to a reasonable search and agreement by the parties on things like search terms, et cetera.

And, likewise, Gryphon asked for discovery of Sphere into this spoofing incident, and that really is what forms the basis for the parties' present dispute. So Gryphon -- and this is at Request Number 17, 18, 19, and 24, and I'll just kind of summarize them here, rather than read each one into the record; although, you know, if Your Honor prefers, certainly I can do that. gist of these requests -- and I know because I wrote them -- was that, essentially, you know, we want the information into, essentially, your internal control, because, you know, it's our position that, while you assert that, you know, this spoofing incident was Gryphon's fault, you know, we actually think it was your fault because how did this third-party actor even get into your system in the first place?

And so, therefore, we ask for documents concerning their cybersecurity hardware, documents that maybe have reflected any sort of forensic

investigation that Sphere did after the incident, and then any communications kind of underlying its claims that it was basically Gryphon's fault that this incident happened.

So, essentially, our argument is pretty simple. It boils down to the fact that, having raised the claims regarding the spoofing incident in the second amended complaint, Gryphon should be entitled to probe Sphere's accusations that the spoofing incident is Gryphon's fault, as opposed to Sphere's. As the Court well knows and needs no education from me on this point, but Rule 26 entitles civil litigants in discovery about information that is relevant not only to a party's claim, but also to its defenses.

And, here, discovery into the spoofing incident goes right to the heart of Gryphon's affirmative defenses as to the spoofing claims. For example, in our fourth amended complaints -- and this is at ECF-62 -- we've raised affirmative defenses like failure to state a claim, unclean hands, Sphere's claims against Gryphon are barred in whole or in part by Sphere's own negligence. You know, we deny Gryphon's allegations. For example, the one that I read earlier by saying that, you

know, we deny that Gryphon's at fault here, you know, and, instead, we think that this is really Sphere's undoing.

So it seems like Sphere's entire kind of objection by the way of producing any documents about spoofing -- this isn't a situation where the parties kind of disagree around, you know, the margins as to, you know, what kind of narrowed construction, you know, the parties will agree to. Here, it's that Sphere's flat out refusing to producing anything to Gryphon with respect to this spoofing claim.

And I think -- as I understand the argument, and Mr. Wolf I'm sure will go into it in further detail, but as I understand it, they're basically saying, well, you know, Gryphon, you previously asserted an affirmative claim over the spoofing incident for negligence, and because you withdrew it, that claim -- that affirmative claim or counterclaim against us, that means that you don't get discovery into it. And on that one, really, we just -- we don't understand it because I think the language of Rule 26 is quite clear that, you know, a party gets discovery not only into its claims, but also defenses.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And then it also has raised this issue that, well, you know, we're no longer seeking monetary relief as a result of these allegations about the spoofing incident. So because we're not seeking any monetary relief, like, you shouldn't be worried about it and you're not entitled to discovery. But, you know, with all due respect, at the same time, I said to Mr. Wolfe that, well, if you're not seeking any monetary relief, then why are you asserting the claim, you know, and we can kind of all like go home and forget about the discovery if you're willing to basically strike those allegations from your complaint, because I don't feel comfortable proceeding with the case if those allegations remain live. Again, there are 24 paragraphs addressing it in the complaint, and he refused to do so, which was well within his rights to do so.

But, that said, the claims remain live in the case and we're entitled to probe that. And so, today, what we're here to ask the Court to do is basically -- either if Mr. Wolfe has had an opportunity to kind of reconsider his position, accept his striking of those allegations, or if he's not prepared to do that, we would ask for the

following: So Sphere, essentially -- as I mentioned, this spoofing incident is the subject of discovery on both sides. So they asked for information about Gryphon's internal controls, and then we obviously asked for information into the spoofing incident and their internal controls.

The parties exchanged search terms. We include a number of, like, specific search terms that were specifically tailored to our requests regarding this spoofing incident, you know, as parties do. Sphere came back to us and said, you know, here are the number of hits for all of these requests -- or these search terms that you've provided, including the specific ones that have to do with the spoofing. And I'm talking about search terms like "spoof" or "hack" or "attack."

And we know, based on the hit report that

Sphere gave to us, that all of the search terms that

specifically relate to the spoofing incident only

generate about 1,000 unique hits. And so our

position is that the information relating to the

spoofing incident is relevant. The Court should

order Sphere to produce these documents in full.

And if it's not willing to do that, we're willing to accept yet another compromise; basically,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Sphere reviewing those around 1,000 documents that we know hit on our search terms specifically defined to get at those assets. And then we would, furthermore, request that the Court orders Sphere to produce any kind of report that we understand exists stemming from Sphere's investigation into the incident. So with that, unless the Court has any other questions, I'm happy to seize the podium, so to speak, to Mr. Wolfe. THE COURT: Just one, I guess. Just to sum it up, it sounds like Gryphon's argument is that there's these various -- or specifically 24 paragraphs in the complaint that reference the spoofing incident. So even if Sphere is not seeking monetary damages based off of the incident, there are still allegations that support the claim. And for that reason, you think they're relevant and you'd be entitled to this discovery? MS. CARTER: That's completely correct. You very eloquently said what I said in 10 minutes in about 30 seconds. THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to make sure, because sometimes I miss it, and I want to

make sure I understand. So, you know, again, I'm

happy to give you time to respond once I hear from Mr. Wolfe, if he wants to chime in.

MS. CARTER: Thank you.

MR. WOLFE: Sure, Your Honor. Thank you.

So let me start at the end and then I'll go and provide some background.

What I would say is, lots of times parties include allegations in their complaint to give the court context into the claims. In this case, the context of the spoofing attacks is, now that Gryphon had been asserting meritless claims against Sphere and that that is what prompted the lawsuit and that they had been -- they had been advocating Scorsese litigation against Sphere, unless Sphere exceeded to their claims.

When we first filed the complaint, we had needed to assert damages on those claims. And the reason for that was Gryphon had purported to return the stolen assets to Sphere, but it had done so with reservation. It wasn't a true return. During the course of the litigation, Gryphon gave up any claim that it was, in fact, entitled to those assets. It gave up any claim that Sphere had been negligent.

And here's the background I'll give you,
Your Honor. Gryphon -- after Sphere asserted its

complaint, Gryphon filed counterclaims asserting a negligence claim, and Sphere filed a partial motion to dismiss that claim on the ground that Sphere owed no duty to Gryphon to prevent third parties from impersonating Sphere. And based on that partial motion, Judge Castel stayed all discovery, including into the negligence claim. And Gryphon asked to lift the stay, and Sphere opposed on two grounds:

Number One, that the claim was totally without merit; and, second, that dismissal of that claim would narrow discovery, including because it would obviate the need for discovery into Sphere's internal documents, into the phishing attack. And Judge Castel agreed with us and maintained the stay.

And in response, and this tells you what Gryphon thinks about its own negligence claim and the notion that Sphere was negligent and owed to a duty, Gryphon elected to dismiss the negligence claim with prejudice. So Gryphon has no basis to pursue internal discovery into Sphere, into Sphere's reaction to the spoofing attack because it's not ultimately relevant to any claim or defense.

We've disclaimed that we're pursuing damages on our affirmative claims stemming from the spoofing attack. But even if we had been, it's

simply not relevant to any affirmative defense that Gryphon is purporting to raise, right. It raises an -- we made very detailed arguments in our letter about why that is so. There is an unclean hands defense, but that only applies when a party is seeking equitable relief, right. Unclean hands can only be used to bar a claim for equitable release. We're not seeking equitable relief.

And then a party's negligence is no defense to a breach of contract claim, and it's also no defense to a breach of fiduciary duty claim. So we're not seeking damages based on the spoofing attacks. There's no basis to pursue our reaction to the spoofing attacks. And even if we were, Your Honor, the affirmative defenses would just fail at the outset because negligence isn't a defense to breach of contract or to breach of fiduciary duty.

Your Honor, with that, I'm happy to answer any questions you might have. Otherwise, I'll rest.

THE COURT: Ms. Carter, was there anything you wanted to add?

MS. CARTER: Very briefly.

So I take Mr. Wolfe to say that, you know, all of the numerous, numerous allegations about the spoofing allegations and complaint are just context.

Well, if that's really true, then why is he pursuing discovery as to it? He's never offered to withdraw that discovery of Gryphon on this topic. And, frankly, what I really don't want to happen here, Your Honor, is I don't want this -- like, I don't want Sphere to be able to kind of willy-nilly whenever it wants to kind of bring out these allegations about spoofing.

The spoofing incident is evidence that, A, Sphere -- or my client, Gryphon, either didn't perform under the MSA or did a bad job performing under the MSA, or somehow there was a breach of fiduciary duty as a result of that, and that's my concern. If Mr. Wolfe really means what he says, that it's just context, that he would be okay with just basically reducing the statement to one paragraph, I guess, in the paragraph, or -- and additionally, not pursue discovery of it.

And then as to his position that negligence is not a defense to breach of contract, as everyone on this phone call knows, breach of contract, an element of that is causation. And we're entitled to say that Sphere cannot establish breach of contract on the basis of these claims, because it wasn't our -- it wasn't Gryphon's fault. It wasn't -- we

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
weren't the cause of this act of the spoofing
incident, and it's just completely unfair and -- and
like I said, I've offered, I think, a meaningful,
narrowing, even, of the request, as stated, to just
basically review the 1,000 or so hits that resulted
from our specific search terms, in addition to
ordering any reports that resulted from it. And,
frankly, I think that's very, very reasonable under
the circumstances.
         And that's all I have. Thank you.
         MR. WOLFE: May I respond very briefly,
Your Honor?
         THE COURT: Yes. So, Mr. Wolfe, I just did
have a question.
         MR. WOLFE: Of course.
         THE COURT: Is part -- I guess, is part of
your breach of the -- breach of contract or breach
of fiduciary duty claims relying on an argument that
Gryphon somehow caused or lack of internal controls
led to the spoofing incident?
         MR. WOLFE: For our affirmative claims, we
no longer need to rely on that because there's no
damage anymore.
         THE COURT: Okay. So is there any part of
your affirmative claims that rely in any way on the
```

1 spoofing incident? 2 MR. WOLFE: Other than -- at this point, other than for context, no, our affirmative claims 3 do not. And you have my representation, which I 4 5 think is binding. THE COURT: So let me just ask, I'm just 6 7 curious, why are you seeking discovery about 8 their -- I guess the controls or whatever 9 obligations they had to prevent this spoofing incident? 10 11 MR. WOLFE: You know, I think that's probably an artifact, Your Honor, of a time when --12 13 when that would have been relevant. Let me -- I'm 14 not sure that we actually need that discovery 15 anymore, so if I could, you know, give that some 16 thought. But I don't think we'll need it for 17 our ... 18 THE COURT: Because it sounds --And Ms. Carter, you should let me know if 19 20 this doesn't work. 21 But it sounds like we have a representation 22 on the record from counsel that the spoofing 23 incident is not underlying any part of their claim. 24 And it sounds like Mr. Wolfe is going to 25 confirm whether he even continues to need this

discovery. It sounds like there wouldn't be a reason for it. And so now it sounds like -- I don't know how many -- how much Gryphon has already -- how much discovery has already been provided on this issue, but it sounds like there'd be parity and that no one might potentially be providing discovery that stems from the spoofing incident.

MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honor. I would accept that representation with the caveat that I would like to be able to basically raise this issue to the Court's attention again to the extent that Sphere continues in the future, to reference a spoofing incident as a source of wrongdoing or liability.

THE COURT: Okay. So maybe I can do this, just to clear up, so we have, like, a record in the future in case this becomes a problem later on. I can enter an order sort of memorializing Mr. Wolfe's representation. And then should there be a reason to, Gryphon could have something to rely on if there's a reason to raise it again.

MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honor. May I just -- I think it's -- if I may, and I'm sorry. I hope I didn't interrupt. It just seems cleaner to me --

1 Greq, is there any reason why you just 2 can't agree on the record to strike those 3 allegations from the complaint? MR. WOLFE: I don't know why I need to 4 5 strike allegations that are context to the litigation. You know, the plaintiffs include 6 context in their claims all the time, right. We're 7 not seeking damages on the claims, and so it's a 8 9 question of what's relevant to the discovery, right. The question is, are internal documents 10 11 relevant? So I don't see why I have to, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: But I didn't think --13 Sorry. Go ahead, Ms. Carter. 14 MS. CARTER: No, please. I'm sorry, Your 15 Honor. 16 THE COURT: It's fine. So I hear what Mr. 17 Wolfe says, but I do think, Ms. Carter, you'd be 18 protected if I make clear in an order what the affirmative -- what the representation is by 19 20 counsel. So I just wanted to get Mr. Wolfe, again, 21 to say it on the record so I can write it down and 22 put it in an order. And I'm not misrepresenting 23 what he's saying either. 24 MR. WOLFE: Sure. We're not seeking 25 damages on our affirmative claims that stem from the spoofing attack.

THE COURT: But I thought it was a little bit -- and maybe this is just -- right. I thought it was a little broader earlier, which is that no part of your affirmative claims relied on the spoofing incident.

MR. WOLFE: Sure. We will not be asserting that there's a liability. I do want to make clear, though, that doesn't mean that the spoofing incident won't be relevant to our defenses that we're asserting against Gryphon. And it's their burden to us to articulate relevance on this. But as far as our affirmative claims, we will not be.

MS. CARTER: I'm a little concerned. I think we're actually backtracking here because if you intend to raise this as part of your defense to our allegations, that you breached the contract, and you're going to throw it back in my face and say, well, actually, you breached the contract here, I don't see how that memorializes kind of the spirit of what I think you're agreeing to here, which is that it's no longer -- spoofing incident is no longer a part of this case.

MR. WOLFE: Yeah, I didn't say that, and that wasn't the basis for relevance articulated by

your side, ever, right.

THE COURT: Let me just ask, because I might be missing something, if Sphere intends to point to the spoofing incident in defense to some of Gryphon's counterclaims, Mr. Wolfe, can you just explain to me, then, why it wouldn't be relevant for Gryphon to understand whatever internal controls or procedures Sphere has?

MR. WOLFE: Sure. So I'll give two bases:

Number One, it's my adversary's burden to articulate this, Your Honor, and they haven't articulated it.

I'm helping them out now because they never articulated, but I don't want there to be any -- as you said, I don't want there to be anything from either side, a misunderstanding, and I don't want to mislead the Court on that.

Number Two is, it's what I said earlier.

They've asserted but one claim, and that's that there's a -- we breached our contract, right.

Negligence is, categorically, not a defense to breach of contract. We cited case law to Your Honor of that. There's only about four causations in breach of contract. There's no proximate causation, right.

So negligence is not a defense to breach of

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So there's a reason that they never asserted that their affirmative claims have anything to do with negligence. It's because negligence couldn't -- our negligence, whatever it was, could not be a defense. And, second, even if it could be, we owed no duty to Gryphon. And Your Honor knows this because they dropped the claim with prejudice in response to our motion to dismiss, in which we said that the reason it should be dropped is that we owe no duty to them. There's simply no duty that parties owe each other to prevent the spoofing attack. MS. CARTER: Your Honor, if I may offer potentially a solution that could be helpful? THE COURT: Sure. MS. CARTER: Could we just -- I mean, I would agree to a stipulation that basically says that neither party asserts liability -- any liability with respect to the spoofing incident, and that the spoofing incident is not relevant to discovery or should not be a subject of discovery. I mean, if neither party is asserting liability with respect to the spoofing incident, I just -- it seems simple that we could just say that.

MR. WOLFE: Yeah. I think it's a defense

1 to the breach of contract claims you've asserted 2 against us, right. The spoofing attack is relevant 3 to that. MS. CARTER: But we haven't asserted any --4 5 we haven't asserted the spoofing incident as a basis for a breach of contract claim. And as you said 6 earlier, we withdrew our negligence claim with 7 respect to spoofing. Spoofing is not any part of 8 9 our -- our affirmative case, and it won't be a part 10 of our defensive case, so long as you make a 11 representation that you're not promising any 12 liability on it. 13 MR. WOLFE: It won't be part of your --14 I'm sorry, Your Honor, that we're doing 15 cross talk now. THE COURT: No, no, no. If it's helpful, 16 17 if you can resolve the --18 MR. WOLFE: Yeah. So -- I apologize. I feel like we're on a meet and confer. 19 20 So it won't be a part of our affirmative 21 case. We're not seeking damages on it. We don't 22 need to. 23 But as far as -- you know, we do contend that it's a -- as far as our defense case, right, we 24 25 contend that the spoofing attack was a breach as

part of the defense's case, and that that's a defense for us. And that defense is --

MS. CARTER: Then we just come back full circle to Rule 26, which says that either party is entitled to discovery on any claims -- any party's claim or defense.

MR. WOLFE: But, Your Honor -- and I'll reiterate -- they still need to articulate a basis of how they could use the discovery, and this was my point, right. Even if -- even if we had thought affirmative, right -- they only mentioned one basis for relevance. But even if we have been seeking damages and now we're on to our defenses, even if it's a defense, they still have to be able to use it in a way to defeat the defense. And it can't be used because, A, it's not -- a party's negligence has nothing to do with a defense to breach of contract, ultimately; and, B, it just -- there's no duty here.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Wolfe, I think I follow you, but this is where you may have lost me. So it sounds like Ms. Carter had represented that spoofing is not part of Gryphon's case, and that her client was not asserting liability with regards to the spoofing, which sounds somewhat similar, if not

1 identical, to what you had previously said. But 2 then when you said why you needed discovery into the spoofing from Gryphon, you said it would be relevant 3 to your defenses to their claim; am I right? 4 5 MR. WOLFE: Correct. So an act can be, right, a breach of contract, right. So I no longer 6 need to pursue a breach of contract claim based on 7 this, because they've returned the assets and 8 9 they've now given up any claim to the assets. 10 But they've claimed that Gryphon breached 11 the contract, that Gryphon breached the -- excuse 12 They've claimed that Sphere breached the MSA, me. 13 and I'm entitled to assert that they breached the 14 MSA as a defense, right. And that's the difference, 15 right. I'm not trying to argue -- I mean, that's 16 the inherent difference. I'm able to assert it as a 17 defense on a contractual ground. 18 THE COURT: And your defense would be that they breached the contract because they were 19 20 negligent in preventing the spoofing? 21 MR. WOLFE: Not negligent, necessarily, 22 Your Honor. By disobeying the plain terms of the 23 contract, right. They're only allowed to -- they're 24 only allowed to respond to our written 25 construction -- instructions, right.

So to give you more background, Your Honor, Gryphon held Sphere's digital assets as part of the deal, right. And as part of that, they -- there's a provision in the contract that they -- they have to essentially obey our instructions to hold or sell those digital assets. Obviously, they can't be just transmitting those assets to a third party under the contract. And so that's the distinction, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So I just wanted to make sure, because I thought you had told me none of this was on defense. And it sounded like, potentially, you were looking into Gryphon's negligence, but it sounds like that's not really the argument you'd be making. It'd be something related to whether they were authorized to release this, based on whatever the MSA required for instructions for bitcoin.

MR. WOLFE: Exactly, Your Honor. And it's not -- and it's not a claim I'm -- right. And it's not a claim I'm seeking further damages on anymore, because I don't need to. Because they've -- right. I did when I first filed the case because they were asserting that -- you know, they were asserting that it was our fault, essentially. I don't need to anymore because they've conceded that, right. They

dismissed their negligence claim with prejudice, and so I don't need to anymore.

But as far as a contractual defense, I still maintain it, and they didn't raise it. But I want to -- they didn't raise it in this conference as a basis of relevance, but I want to be very clear with the Court that it will be relevant to our affirmative claims in terms of context, but it's not a basis of "I need to establish liability against them." In order to prove my affirmative claims, I won't be seeking to do it, I won't be seeking damages from them. As far as a defense, it will be relevant to this defense.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Ms. Carter, I guess, given what we've discussed with Mr. Wolfe, I guess I'm -- I'm not seeing a clear link showing why this information would be relevant to Gryphon's case.

MS. CARTER: Right. So if Mr. -- first of all, to be very clear, our breach of contract case has to do with Sphere violating exclusivity provision. Okay? I don't see how information relating to the spoofing incident is relevant to that.

But in any event, if they somehow construe our breach of contract claim as involving or is

warranting the spoofing incident as part of its defense, then we've come full circle, and I need discovery into the spoofing incident so that we can make an argument into that. And I think we're right back where we are, which is I've already made a reasonable proposal myself. Even though Sphere hasn't offered any narrowing options of our discovery, I have offered to narrow my own request by saying, okay, then you need to review the 1,000 documents that hit on our specific search terms for the spoofing incident, review those, and then produce any that are not privileged, in addition to any reports.

I just feel like Mr. Wolfe, in some ways, is talking out of both sides of his mouth. It is in the case. It's not in the case. It's just context. And, frankly, these are not clear lines. And I think that the best thing to do would be either, if it's at any -- if it forms any part of any party's claim or defense, there should be discovery into it.

MR. WOLFE: Yeah. And I'll just end with, Your Honor, it's still their burden to articulate how they would use the discovery. And even if it's part of my defenses, I'm not hearing how they could use the discovery as a defense -- you know, as a way

to (inaudible), right. There's no articulation of how we have a duty.

They basically admitted we don't have a duty by dismissing their own negligence claim of prejudice. And there's no articulation of how it -- you know, how they would say, if I say you breached the contract and that's an antecedent breach, that forgives performance, that they can then say, well, Sphere, you were negligent, you can't use that as a defense, right. The case was very clear.

The concept of negligence, those are tort concepts. They don't have anything do with contract with --

MS. CARTER: Just to be clear, I mean, the argument that I made earlier with respect to the elements of a breach of contract are true on both sides, right. If I have to prove up on a breach of contract and you're basically saying you can't prove causation because I think that, you know, you were breaching under the contract, then it is relevant to that.

And I just -- I don't -- I can't imagine a world in which that you can assert an affirmative defense that you're unwilling to give up, that I don't get, under Rule 26, discovery into that, even

the limited discovery I've asked you to review.

1

2 MR. WOLFE: Sorry, Your Honor. I have one more back-and-forth. 3 I think I'll reiterate it, which is, you 4 5 know, we cited very clear case law on this, that -you know, you normally -- you see the four elements 6 of breach of contract. It's usually an agreement, a 7 breach, material, and damage, right. You normally 8 9 don't see causation. It is probably true that "but for causation" is an element. 10 11 But we're aware -- we cite case law telling 12 Your Honor that negligence concepts are just not 13 applicable to breach of contract. And I don't hear 14 my adversary, who's seen that case law for a month, 15 prepare to propose a case to you that says, no, no, 16 actually, these negligence concepts are applicable 17 in breach of contract cases. And the fact that one 18 side didn't exercise reasonable care forgives my own 19 breach, right. And -- and --20 MS. CARTER: Sorry. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Wolfe, are you done or ... 22 MR. WOLFE: I am done. 23 THE COURT: And, Ms. Carter, did you want 24 to respond? 25 MS. CARTER: Just one thing.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I mean, Mr. Wolfe just conceded that "but for causation" is a component of breach of contract and we have -- there are -- there are affirmative defenses that you failed to say the cause of action. Just because we did not pursue a motion to dismiss does not mean that we've conceded anything. And I just -- I think that we are very, very far into the minutia, which is, frankly, not required under Rule 26, which, in this context, provides a broad standard for relevance. And I think I've been more than reasonable, willing to make all sorts of representations on the record. I've been willing to, as a result, drop the discovery, but I'm not willing to drop the discovery if it remains an issue in the case, whether it's part of someone's claims or defenses. THE COURT: I think -- so I'm just going to -- if we want to just table this one and move on to the next issue. So that's the dispute that Sphere raises like (inaudible) --MR. WOLFE: Yes. Thank you. Give me one moment, Your Honor, if I may. Okay. So, Your Honor, I quess we'll go

back to our affirmative claims. So the -- the gist

of our theory is that -- excuse me. Sphere has

brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim predicated on Gryphon treating its miners and investment strategies better than Spheres. The gist of our claim is that Gryphon undertook a fiduciary duty to Sphere to treat basically Sphere's property as if it were its own property, and that it prioritized its own interests over those of Sphere.

And I saw a reference in my adversary's letter that we -- you know, we haven't pleaded any facts to support the claim. The fact is -- are that based on monthly reports that we've received and reviewed, Gryphon's miners consistently outperformed Sphere's miners, and Sphere has studied the issue. It's looked into potential explanations, and it can't find a legitimate explanation. You know, the machines, the way the machines operate, if they're all being operated by the same operator or, in this case, provider, they should all perform basically equally. It shouldn't be a case where Gryphon's machines consistently outperform Sphere's.

Now, if Gryphon wanted to avoid discovery on this issue, it was incumbent to move to dismiss the claim on the pleadings, and Gryphon opted not to move to dismiss the claim; thus, conceding its legal sufficiency. There's no dispute, nor can there be,

that the claim is legally sufficient. And even if Gryphon wants to say, well, we haven't conceded that, the claim remains in the case, and it will until summary judgment, which won't be heard, you know, probably for another six months, should either side choose to move.

Now, nevertheless, Gryphon's contention is that it should not have to yield discovery on the subject because it doesn't like the claim, it doesn't think much of it, and that's not permitted by the discovery rules. What Gryphon can't do is it can't concede the legal sufficiency of the claim by not moving to dismiss and then refuse to give any discovery that would validate our allegations and then assert on summary judgment that Sphere has failed to do sufficient facts to support the claim, precisely because Gryphon has withheld discovery.

Gryphon has asserted no particularized relevance objection. You don't see a relevance objection anywhere in their R and Os. And what you do see are boilerplate objections of an undue burden overbreadth, and disproportionality. And the burden is on Gryphon, of course, to assert an objection there. And what we're ultimately asking Gryphon to do is nothing that we're unwilling to do ourselves

and that Gryphon hasn't asked of us.

And in terms of overbreadth, undue burden, proportionality, the law in the district is clear:
What's good for the goose is good for the gander.
And Gryphon has no response for that -- I'm sure
Your Honor has heard that a thousand times. Gryphon has no response to that background principle, other than just to wave it away and say, well, our discovery into Sphere shouldn't matter.

Gryphon's seeking the exact same intrusive discovery into Sphere's business. It simply states that the Court should assume that its claims are going to have merit and that Sphere's claims won't, and, thus, it should be permitted to seek wide-ranging discovery into Sphere's business, and that's not fair.

Gryphon has not suggested how the request will increase the volume of documents it has to review and produce. Although we sent search terms to Gryphon weeks ago, Gryphon just produced its hit report after we filed our letter. And in its letter, it asserts that our hit report hit on 80,000 documents, and that's twice the number that Sphere's agreed to review. So it's evidence of overbreadth and undue burden, and that's, at best, misleading,

Your Honor.

We were very clear that -- right, we sent an initial set of search terms and, of course, that's subject to negotiation. It looks like one of the terms wasn't appropriately calibrated and it returned something like 40,000 unique hits. And, of course, Gryphon responded that it's going to remove that term and substitute new terms in, and our expectation -- and we're not going to ask Gryphon to do anything we're unwilling to do. Our expectation is that Gryphon will review around the same number of documents that we will, ultimately, where we're hoping to land somewhere around 40,000. And -- nothing Sphere's unwilling to do.

So the notion that our search is asking Gryphon to search for something unreasonable is baseless. We're only asking Gryphon to search documents that hit on search terms and to produce go-gets, which we define as easily identifiable documents, such as mining reports that are not necessarily amenable to search terms, but that a party knows exists and are easily -- that can easily be produced.

Obviously, we're not asking Gryphon to search for needles in haystacks as part of this, but

in our experience, oftentimes, parties do generate mining reports and performance reports, and they basically know where to find those documents.

They're either centrally located or they all come from the same email address. So there's a program called Minder Report. And so every day, you'll get a report from @minderreport.com sent to your email. You know, that's something we would expect that Gryphon knows and can easily produce.

There's nothing about those reports that will raise privilege concerns that can be identified through one single search term. So there's been nothing to suggest that, what we're asking them to produce through these requests, is going to somehow exacerbate the burden on them or, you know, cause them to do something, again, that we're unwilling to do.

I just want to note, they say that what we basically asked is for discovery into the entire business, but I don't think that's quite right.

Like we discussed at the beginning, Your Honor,

Gryphon and Sphere are in the business of mining, and they send their miners out to hosts. It's the host that really ensure the operation of the miners.

But what the customer does is they say if their

miners are down, if they're not performing up to snuff, they'll then reach out to the host and say, why is this going on? Can you repair my miners? Can you improve this? Can you make it so that they run better?

It's not like Gryphon and Sphere, I don't think, at least, are generating, you know, hundreds of emails every day about the operation of miners, and I haven't heard that from the other side.

Gryphon does lots of stuff that we're not seeking discovery into. It purchases miners. It has employees, right. It rents space. It raises money. It has securities filings. We're not seeking any of that.

What we're seeking is how -- their searches for hosting. My understanding is they have about one or two hosting partners. So you find hosting, and then, presumably, you're not doing much else beyond that. And then, like I said, you're making sure that the host keeps your miners operational, and that's what we're really after here. And we're not -- we're not going to be asking that -- you know, search for tens of thousands of additional documents that don't hit on a search term universe that's not proportional to what we'll agree to

search for, too.

I want to address the cases that my adversary cited. One is the Edmondson case, which states that disclosure should not be directed simply to permit a phishing expedition. And that line of case law really goes to where relevance is at issue. Parties have failed to articulate relevance, and that's not this case -- the relevance is clear. We have an allegation that Gryphon's miners outperformed ours, but, of course, we need discovery to validate that allegation. And the relevance is clear, and there is no relevance objection.

(phonetic) case for this proposition, that proportionality and relevance are conjoined concepts. What Viossi (phonetic) is saying is the greater the relevance of information in an issue, the less likely discovery will be found to be disproportionate. And, again, the discovery we're seeking is directly relevant to our claim. We need to know how Sphere's miners performed. We need to know how Gryphon's miners performed, and we need to know why Gryphon's miners performed the way they did and why Sphere's miners performed the way they did.

So with that, unless Your Honor has

1 questions, I'll turn it over to my adversary. 2 THE COURT: No. Mr. Carter, I understand 3 the argument on this one. 4 Ms. Carter? 5 MS. CARTER: Yes. Thank you. 6 THE COURT: I got the names wrong. 7 apologize. 8 MS. CARTER: No, it's okay. 9 So, first of all, on this issue that, you 10 know, we haven't -- we refuse to provide discovery, 11 first of all, that's not correct. I have actually 12 offered to provide Gryphon with narrowly tailored 13 discovery that seems extremely relevant to whatever 14 claims that it's asserting, essentially agree -agree to produce documents that, you know, discuss 15 16 the relative performance of Gryphon's versus 17 Sphere's, but that wasn't good enough. 18 The major problem that I have here, which I have asserted since the beginning, is that Sphere 19 20 refuses to limit its requests, which do go to the 21 heart of Gryphon's business. For example, I mean, 22 even the example that Mr. Wolfe provided about, you 23 know, communications between Gryphon's and its --24 its hosting companies about whether or not miners 25 are online or offline, like that would be

encompassed by Mr. Wolfe's, like, very broad, far-ranging discovery, which includes all documents and communications concerning Gryphon's efforts to ensure the operations of its miners.

So my issue from the beginning, and,
frankly, I think that Sphere has been unreasonable
in that it has not come back with any suggestion for
the narrowing of these overbroad requests. And with
respect to proportionality, the argument there is
clear, I can identify one factual assertion that -in the complaint that Sphere has that underpinned
this fiduciary duty claim on this kind of
self-prioritization concept, which is that -- I'm
reading from paragraph 47 right now. For example,
on a monthly basin, Gryphon has reported a
substantially higher mining efficio ratio than
Sphere, which would not occur if Gryphon were acting
to avoid self-dealing.

Well, first of all, I contest that that's the only explanation for why there might be differences in efficiency rations. But, moreover, why does that one allegation that's completely conclusory entitle Sphere to all sorts of information about Gryphon's business that has nothing to do with Sphere? I, frankly, don't

understand that, and I think Mr. Wolfe has been unreasonable in refusing to engage in real discussion about the narrowing of those terms.

Although, you know, the only suggestion that Mr. Wolfe has made is that, well, we can use search terms and that will ameliorate any burden concern that you have, Gryphon. Well, we ran the terms -- and, by the way, Mr. Wolfe knew that we were on the cusp of producing a hit report when he decided to file the letter motion on Friday evening. That was his prerogative to do so. And I understand why he did it because he obviously wanted to tee the issue up with enough time for Your Honor to hear it today. That's fine, but then don't criticize me that you didn't have -- you know, you didn't have the information from me that -- that underscored the burden that's associated with this far-flung discovery.

And not only that, he's not even agreeing to just cap, essentially, the discovery at whatever search terms or the application of search terms applied to the documents for custodians. He's not even agreeing to a cap it at like the 80,000 or whatever documents. He also wants certain unspecified, quote/unquote, go-gets, which go to

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Gryphon's only business, having nothing to do here. And he provides, by way of example, reports, things like that, and, "Oh, don't worry, I won't ask you for other things." But, frankly, anything that Gryphon does that it knows of, that is potentially responsible, is potentially at fair game under the parameters of his discovery.

Although, for example, although the parties have agreed to four custodians, there's more than four people who work at Gryphon. And so does that mean I have to go rooting around all of their emails trying to find, oh, I'm going to email X person about our miners. How are they doing at the host? Are they okay? Again, none of this has anything to do with Sphere. And, frankly, I don't even understand, then, the purpose of applying search terms, because under this, like, theory that I still have to provide, notwithstanding the search terms, additional documents that are responsive, that are go-gets, like, then why would I just have to review, like, for example, the entire mailbox of Ron Chang -- of Rob Chang, the president of Gryphon, that this is what he does all day, every day, you know, manage the miners, think about where are we deploying them, which pool should we use?

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And, frankly, I don't understand why Mr. Gryphon -- or Mr. Wolfe needs this for the purposes of his claim. He apparently has access to reports, unspecified reports, that show in his characterization that, allegedly, Gryphon's miners are doing better than Sphere's. I mean, he has that information. So if he has that, why does he need to have invasive discovery into Gryphon's operations of its own miners that have nothing to do with Sphere? And for that reason, I have consistently objected to the overbreadth and proportionality of the request. And I take issue with Mr. Wolf's position that I didn't raise relevance as an objection in response to these requests. Quite clearly, relevance is part of the proportionality consideration. And to the extent that there is any relevance here to the fiduciary duty claim, we would maintain that it is small. And in light of that small amount of relevance, we have commensurately agreed to produce a narrow set of documents, which apparently is just, frankly, not good enough for Mr. Wolfe. And in terms of the goose and the gander,

And in terms of the goose and the gander,

I'm not sure what he's referring to. If he's

referring to the document request that he's agreed

to respond to that are not the subject of a motion to compel, frankly, I don't understand. It's not incumbent on me to make arguments for him on what he should object to or not object to or agree to produce. And all of the document requests that he's referring to are specific to Sphere's engagement with third parties, which is the entire basis of this lawsuit, is that that was in breach of an exclusivity provision under the MSA.

I would submit that this fiduciary duty on the basis of the relative performance of miners, so-called justifying, that sort of far-flung discovery, is just a sideshow, and I hope that the Court can appreciate that. And, again, I think I've more than met my obligations to meet and confer. I didn't just stand on my objection to producing documents. I offered to compromise. And my offers of compromise have been met with nothing, no yielding on the other side. And I don't think that the Court should countenance that type of broad discovery on kind of threadbare allegations about respective performance. Thank you.

THE COURT: So I guess just a question, because it seems like there's a few categories of topics that are at issue. And so I'm just curious,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the topic relating to the selection of mining pools for Gryphon, I just want to understand the process that went on. Is this where you ran the search terms and the hit report had 80,000 documents? MS. CARTER: Yeah, it's a good question. It's a little confusing. Sphere -- if I may answer, and then, of course, Mr. Wolfe will weigh in, but ... So Sphere propounded these requests, including a request for, what is, a selection of mining pools, right. And they said, don't -- I said, that's -- you know, that's too much. It's too burdensome. And they said, well, don't worry about it, we'll give you search terms. They gave a search term for four custodians. We ran them. That yielded 80,000 documents. And my point being that, is that even there, even there, Gryphon has not -- or Sphere has not limited itself to just reviewing those documents. It's maintained that, in addition to those documents that hit on search terms, I still need to go out and find other documents that are responsive to this request, which, as I've said, is

essentially Gryphon's business. So I just think

that these are extremely overbroad and unwarranted

```
in light of the relevance, if any.
               THE COURT: But let me just ask, I quess,
 2
 3
      is there no way to, perhaps, reduce the number
      either through more targeted search terms or fewer
 5
      custodians or a time period?
              MS. CARTER: It's certainly possible.
 6
 7
      frankly, you know -- again, Mr. Wolfe didn't have
 8
     the benefit of the search report when he kind of
 9
      initiated this process. But, again, I would
10
     maintain that, unless Mr. Wolfe is willing to limit
11
      discovery to the application of reasonable search
     terms across four custodians, then it's kind of like
12
13
     a Sphere victory in some ways, because he's still
14
     asking for these unspecified categories of,
15
     quote/unquote, go-gets for the same --
16
               THE COURT: And what's the -- so let's
17
      say -- what's the -- when you say unspecified
18
     categories of go-gets, are these the monthly reports
     that reflect Gryphon's miners -- what miners --
19
20
     Gryphon miners have done?
21
               MS. CARTER: Yeah. If you don't -- I'm
22
      just going to read -- so I'm sorry. If you could,
23
     do you mind holding on just one second?
24
               THE COURT: Yeah, no worries.
25
               MS. CARTER: Hold on, Mr. -- I just -- I
```

want to answer -- be responsive to the judge's request.

So here -- so I'm now reading from a letter that I received on June 3rd from Mr. Wolfe. And it says: "In addition for certain requests, it will be appropriate for Gryphon to produce so-called go-gets, such as reports reflecting the performance of Gryphon's miners and Sphere's miners. For example, reports from Foundry and Coinmint reflecting uptime and revenues generated, software upgrades, Gryphon's internal policies, communications with potential hosts for Sphere's miners, calculations reflecting consideration --" ba-ba-ba-ba-ba.

Like, it is -- but this -- and then "for the avoidance of doubt, this list of go-gets is illustrative, not exhaustive."

So, you know, even if we were like, okay, we can get these search terms down to some, like, manageable number, like I just -- there's an infinite number of additional responsive material that I would have to produce.

THE COURT: And I suppose I don't -- do we know what the universe -- I guess you don't have a number for the universe of these go-get documents?

```
1
              MS. CARTER: No, because I don't even know
 2
     what the universe of those documents is. Like,
 3
     go-get --
 4
              MR. WOLFE: Your Honor --
 5
              MS. CARTER: Go ahead.
              MR. WOLFE: May I respond, Your Honor?
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.
 8
              MR. WOLFE: Sure. So the 80,000 -- the
 9
     80,000 hit report number isn't real, right.
10
     We've -- it's clear what we said, the hit reports.
11
     Obviously, we're willing to negotiate that down.
12
     And even in the email transmitting the hit reports,
     Gryphon said to us, you know, this isn't a
13
14
     reasonable number. We're going to -- we're going to
15
     tweak some of the search terms.
16
              I think one of them, right, it was clearly
17
     something erroneous had happened in the term we had
18
     suggested, right. It returned something like 60,000
     or 40,000 unique hits. Obviously, there's something
19
20
     wrong there. We have agreed to review about 40,000
21
     search terms. We're not asking -- we're not going
22
     to be asking Gryphon to review double the search
23
     terms we reviewed. We want them to review a similar
24
     number.
25
              On the go-gets, I think in every
```

litigation, there are certain repositories of documents that parties know won't necessarily hit on search terms, but they never let -- agree to produce and, of course, we've agreed to do that, right. If I know that there's some category of report where it hasn't hit on a search term, but I can run one term and they're all there, of course I would produce it, right. What I'm not asking Counsel to do is sift through emails with additional terms where they're not easily collectible.

Unless Your Honor has questions, I would like to respond to some of the points my adversary made.

THE COURT: No. Sure. Go ahead, Mr. Wolfe.

MR. WOLFE: Sure. So my adversary complained that she would be producing a lot of communications with third-party hosts. That's sort of expected. That's a very easy universe to search for, right. You plug in one term, which is the opposing side's, the counterparty's email address. There's no privilege concern because they're counterparties. And then you can batch hack all the documents as relevant. Of course, you'll need to review them for -- you know, in the context of

depositions, but that's very easy.

And, in fact, it's very similar to what our adversaries have had no problem asking us to do.

And if I could, Your Honor, I'd like to read you some of the requests they've served on us.

THE COURT: (Unintelligible.)

MR. WOLFE: Sorry. I'm sorry, Your Honor? Okay. Fair enough.

I mean, if you line them up -- and I regret not putting a chart in the -- in the letter, but they're basically asking for the same discovery of us. The only difference is they think our claim isn't worth anything, right. You know, they don't think we're going to prevail. Well, if they thought we weren't going to prevail, they should have moved to dismiss on the pleadings. And they didn't, and so the claim is live.

I'm entitled to discover, right. I can't just say, oh, your miners outperformed us. And then I have them come back and say, well, look at all these other -- right, we haven't given you any discovery, right? Look at -- Court, look at all these other countervailing reasons that the miners -- our miners could have outperformed yours. Thus, we weren't prioritizing our miners over yours,

right? It's just not -- it's not how discovery works.

As far as the go-gets, look, we've suggested -- let me return to that for just one moment, right. We've suggested something that's pretty common in litigation, right. Search terms and then easily identifiable documents, whether they're located -- whether you can identify them because they're located in a central repository or because you know that, right, at the top of the document, the same term's going to reappear. They always -- or they always come from the same email address, and there's no privilege concern, yada, yada, yada. The same exact thing we'll be doing in our own searches and that Gryphon has asked us to do.

Obviously, if opposing counsel thinks that this procedure is unreasonable, right, A, we wouldn't expect that they'd be asking us to do it, and, B, they should let us know, right. We suggested categories of documents that came to mind and that seemed easily identifiable, right. Mining reports, efficiency reports, and reports reflecting uptime, which basically means, how long is your miner operational?

Why is that relevant? Let's say -- let's say Sphere's and Gryphon's miners go down at the same time for some reason. And Gryphon emails the host and says, get our miners back online first and then get Sphere's miners back online, right; obviously relevant to our claim. It should not be something that is difficult for them to identify.

So with that, Your Honor, unless you have questions, I'll turn it back over.

MS. CARTER: Thank you.

maybe, perhaps, offer some type of compromise, because it sounds like this might be a situation where the parties can go back and meet and confer, given that Mr. Wolfe acknowledges that they're not asking you to search through the 80,000 documents and there might be, perhaps, ways to narrow the search terms to something that would yield fewer results. Is that a possibility for resolution of this?

MS. CARTER: I'm certainly willing to continue to meet on this issue. I would just say, and I just really don't want this to be lost on, Your Honor, is that there is no -- okay. This case is about the MSA. They say we breached it. We say

they breached it. That is the main show.

They've added this tagalong breach of fiduciary duty claim, and the only factual allegation they have to support it is they say there's some report somewhere that says that Gryphon's miners did better than Sphere's, and the only reason -- explanation for that is because, obviously, Gryphon was engaging in self-dealing.

Like, why does that one bare-bone conclusory allegation entitle Sphere to access to Gryphon's entire business, whether or not they're search terms or not? Like, fundamentally, why does Sphere get access to emails that have nothing to do with Sphere's miners? I just reject the premise that this is a fair scope of discovery.

And just to give, like, an example of the types of documents that are subsumed by Sphere's overbroad requests, they, for example, say, you know, we need anything that's -- any documents relating to Gryphon's, you know, offer -- or Gryphon's efforts to ensure the operations of its miners. Like, so do they want me to go and pull invoices? Do they want every email, you know, between the CEO and some third-party hoster saying, "How are the miners doing today? Oh, the

air-conditioning broke. It's 98 degrees in here.

It should be 96." Like, I don't understand why they should be entitled to that sort of far-flung discovery, based on this bare allegation.

And, to be honest, I have to repeat it again. I don't understand Mr. Wolfe's comparison about the goose and the gander. And we've asked for this and we've, you know, not asked for that. All of the discovery that it asked for is directly relevant to Sphere's admitted use of third parties in contravention of the MSA. That is what this case is about. It's obviously -- you know, it's not based on a bare allegation. Gryphon has actually -- or Sphere actually admitted in public filings that it's used third-party hosting. So it's -- like, it's not a phishing expedition, because we know that Sphere entered into agreements with third parties, and we're trying to find out more about that for our breach of contract claim.

By contrast, here, Sphere is saying one conclusory allegation, that there's some report somewhere that says that our things are doing better than theirs, and then they say, okay, open up your business, Gryphon. I fundamentally think that it is not at all the same situation; although, Mr. Wolfe

tries to draw analogy between the two.

That said --

MR. WOLFE: Your Honor --

MS. CARTER: -- I'm happy to continue to meet and confer on this issue, and we can always revisit it with Your Honor, if we're unable to reach agreement.

MR. WOLFE: Your Honor, if I may? It's a notice pleading regime, right? I gave notice of my claims. I'm not required to do anything more than that. The Gryphon -- if it thought that it could get this claim to dismissed on the pleadings, right, if it thought our, allegedly, bare-bone allegation was insufficient, it could have moved to dismiss, and Judge Castel would have made a ruling. It knew it wouldn't work, so it didn't move to dismiss.

I'm not hearing why it's burdensome to produce communications between Gryphon's CEO and its hosting counterparties, right. It's actually very easy, right. Coinmint was a third-party host. I believe there were really only two third-party hosts. It's Coinmint and Core. Plug in "at Core" and "at Coinmint" and simply produce the documents. I haven't heard how many -- it's what we'll be doing in response to their requests. It's not hard.

There's no privilege review involved.

And I'm concerned about the suggestion that we just go back and meet and confer, because what I'm not hearing is a concession, oh, the requests are relevant here, or I think what Your Honor had suggested was a good one and what we've already conceded to, right, which is -- we know 80,000 search hits is way too much, right. We've agreed to review around 30- to 40-, and we think that's where Gryphon should be.

So I'm just not hearing why what we're willing to do is so unfair to Gryphon at the end of the day. And I would like a ruling that there is no relevance objection here, right. There is a proportionality objection, but there's no relevance objection, and they shouldn't be able to withhold documents from us on the basis of relevance. Of course, we're not expecting them to search for -- through every single email they have to find relevant documents. We've suggested a typical process, which is search terms plus easily identifiable documents, the exact same thing we'll be looking through.

MS. CARTER: And one more thing, just to address that. I just -- I don't even -- I don't

even see how Sphere has set up a discrete universe of documents that it's asking the Court compel us to review, given this amorphous concept, without detail of, quote/unquote, go-gets of easily identifiable documents. Even if the Court were to order production in response to this to review, you know, documents hitting on search terms and this amorphous category, like, what is that category?

I think that there's, obviously, additional

I think that there's, obviously, additional room, you know, left for the meet and confer. And, you know, perhaps, this, you know, was not timely brought to the Court's attention, just in light of the ongoing negotiation of search terms, et cetera.

MR. WOLFE: Your Honor, I think it was timely brought before because I'm still not hearing -- I confessed that our requests are seeking relevant information. And, you know, we put in the letter to Your Honor, right, what we said about, you know, what our expectation for search is, which is easily collectible categories of documents, namely, what we know, mining reports, revenue information, and communications with potential hosts.

And that's easily collectible. It's not going to be an extraordinary number of documents.

Gryphon may not like that it has to produce it, but

there's a protective order in place. Obviously, we will adhere to that. So, you know, I would encourage -- you know, obviously, there's more meeting and conferring to be doing because we need to agree on a set of search terms. And, you know, to the extent Ms. Carter has qualms about searching for, you know, what I call go-gets, she can raise those to me.

But I think it should be made clear that our requests need to be responded to as written, at least in terms of relevance.

THE COURT: So I guess just -- I think on this issue, I see why some of these categories of documents could produce relevant -- documents that are relevant, excuse me, to Sphere's claims, but part of the problem is, I think because there wasn't -- I'm not blaming any side on this, but just because there potentially could have been more meet and confers to try to dwindle down the search terms. I haven't really heard the undue burden argument that I typically hear in other cases when parties bring a burden argument where, you know, there's a clear declaration or information concerning what the burden would be of collecting a voluminous production viewing it.

And it sounds like that's because there could be more of a meet and confer to try to either narrow the scope of the search terms or the custodians or whatever the parties can come up with to really get a sense of what the volume would be.

And in terms of the go-get documents, again, it sounds like Mr. Wolfe is willing to have a discussion about what potentially those documents are, and then, perhaps, after a meet and confer, it becomes evident or clear exactly where these reports or documents might be found.

So this is all to say that I think the parties should go and have a discussion, and if you can't agree to narrow the scope of some of these requests, recognizing that they seek relevant information, but potentially are hitting on too voluminous -- the document count is too voluminous, you can always come back to me and we can address the issue again.

MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. WOLFE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If you would like, just because it's the summer and it tends to get busy, is I could give you -- I can schedule you for a conference now, and that way you know you have a date by when you'd

have to come back if you don't reach a resolution.

MR. WOLFE: That would be fantastic, Your Honor, you know, for all our -- you may not have known it from today, but I do think that the parties have negotiated in good faith, and I expect we'll be able to work it out. But it would be good to have a date on the calendar.

MS. CARTER: May I ask a clarifying question?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. CARTER: To that end, it's somewhat wrapped in this, but, yes, I think it would be very helpful to have a date on the calendar to kind of act as stick, so to speak, in forcing further discussion on this topic. Just, you know, kind of given the length of time that is taken to negotiate search terms and all this and basically the scope of the review, if the parties — and I'm not saying that we will need to, but if the parties decide that we need additional time in the schedule to complete discovery — again, I'm not saying we will — but what would be the best kind of mechanism to bring that to your attention, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah. Let me -- let me -- I'm just pulling it up, unless you happen to know the

```
1
     scope of my referral?
 2
               MS. CARTER: I think you would --
              MR. WOLFE: All pretrial.
 3
               THE COURT: Okay. It's just a general
 4
 5
     pretrial referral?
               MR. WOLFE: Yes.
 6
 7
               THE COURT: Okay. So unless he's told
 8
     you -- I mean, I'm -- under the scope of that
 9
     referral, I can extend your deadline, unless he's
10
     told you otherwise. But if you're working together
11
     and you need more time, you know, unless you tell me
12
     that Judge Castel said no on any extensions, I can
13
     give you an extension.
14
              MS. CARTER: Okay. That's helpful to know.
15
     Again, that can -- you know, we can discuss it, and
16
     this issue has not come up yet. I'm just
17
     anticipating issues that may or may not arise down
18
     the road. Thank you.
19
               THE COURT: Of course. Yeah. No problem.
20
     So I'm going to give you -- I just want to take a
21
     few minutes to think about the issue we started
22
     with, which was that ECF-81, and, that, I'll just
23
     issue like, a very short -- very short order, just
24
     giving you the resolution there.
25
               MS. CARTER: Thank you.
```

```
1
               THE COURT: And that won't take me long,
 2
      you know, either later today or tomorrow.
 3
               Is there any other issue anyone else wants
     to raise?
 4
 5
               MR. WOLFE: No, Your Honor. I would just
     ask that, in scheduling, I have hearings on the 19th
 6
     and the 31st of July, so that you don't pick those
 7
 8
     dates, if it's okay with Your Honor.
               THE COURT: 19th and 31st?
 9
               MR. WOLFE: Of July.
10
11
               MS. CARTER: And I'm also out this 15th
      through the 19th, so if maybe we could just avoid
12
13
     that week.
14
               THE COURT: Okay. I will avoid those
15
     dates. And so my order later today will also
      schedule the next conference.
16
17
               MS. CARTER: Thank you very much for, you
     know, the time that the Court has given the parties.
18
19
     We do appreciate it.
20
               MR. WOLFE: Yeah. Thank you -- thank you
21
     for indulging us, Your Honor.
22
               THE COURT: No, of course. It was all very
23
     helpful, and thanks for all the background
24
     information.
25
               Thank you very much, everyone.
```

${\color{red} \underline{C} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{E} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{R} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{T} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{I} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{F} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{I} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{C} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{A} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{T} \hspace{0.1cm} \underline{E}}$ I, Marissa Lewandowski, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the case of Sphere 3D Corp. v. Gryphon Digital Mining, Inc., Docket #1:23-cv-02954-PKC-VF, was prepared using digital transcription software and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Marissa Lewandowski Signature Marissa Lewandowski Date: July 3, 2024